Found 4292 related files. Current in page 1
Southwest Wholesalers is the best party supplier because we focus on the quality of food items and other stuffed provided by us. For more details log in to our website.
JSM Bookkeeping Services providers are skilled to have the funds for bookkeeping facilities that will pardon you to focus upon your business. We are located in Brisbane and Ipswich but are simple an entire bearing in mind again of Sydney.
JSM Accounting Services Brisbane is a small accounting practice rapidly growing accounting firm allows us to offer our clients great personalized service. Our focus is to help each client achieve their individual and/or business goals.
http://bloomingtonford.com/inventory/newsearch/New/ | The 2015 Ford Mustang is loaded with new, innovative safety features. From advanced air bags to enhanced sensors, this car offers plenty of safety equipment while still giving drivers everything they expect from a Mustang
JSM Accountant Ipswich is offering an accounting practice in rapidly growing accounting firm allows us to present our clients a great personalized service. Our focus is to help each client to achieve their individual and/or business goals.
http://bloomingtonford.com/inventory/newsearch/New/ | Whether you are looking for style, fuel efficiency, top speeds, high-tech gadgets, eco-friendly components or deluxe safety features Ford’s 2015 models won’t disappoint. We cruise through some of the most popular cars in America and highlight some of the amazing features.
Reprinted with permission from the IFFGD. Originally printed in Participate -- Vol 7 No 1, Spring 1998. Go to the IFFGD website for Information on subscribing to Participate (and becoming an IFFGD member). People with functional gastrointestinal (GI) disorders can have a variety of symptoms that range from painless diarrhea or constipation, to pain associated with diarrhea and/or constipation (usually called irritable bowel syndrome). There is another, less common condition of abdominal pain that is chronic or frequently recurring; it is not associated with changes in bowel pattern. This condition is called chronic functional abdominal pain (CFAP). CFAP is a functional GI disorder. There are no abnormal x-rays or laboratory findings to explain the pain. It occurs because of altered sensitivity to nerve impulses in the gut and brain, and it is not associated with altered motility in the intestines. For people with CFAP, the pain can be so all-consuming that it becomes the main focus of their lives. Not only does it impact on quality of life, but it has a major economic impact as well. The US Householders Survey of Functional GI Disorders published in 1993 found that people with CFAP missed an average of 12 days of work annually due to illness compared to 4 missed days for people without gastrointestinal symptoms. Also, the number of doctor visits in a year averaged 11 for those with CFAP compared with only 2 for those without CFAP.
This paper examines the complex, often misunderstood, relationship between al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the various militant groups found in FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in Pakistan, including the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan). Much of what is commonly assumed about the Taliban, the TTP and al-Qaeda is based on misinformation, misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of historical events. The Taliban and alQaeda can in many ways be seen as sharing common values, although their ultimate goals remain very different. The Taliban were not part of the mujahedeen fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and emerged only in 1994. Al-Qaeda, for all the conspiracy, did not receive money from the CIA during the 1980s, and was only officially formed as an organisation in 1988. The creation of the TTP in 2007 is another matter, and was created as an umbrella organisation for various Pakistani militant groups, and maintains close ties with al-Qaeda. However, the Pakistani Taliban is not the same Taliban as the one formed in 1994, and although it swears its loyalty to Mullah Omar, its goals differ from that of the Afghani Taliban. We can speak of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in two broad strokes – pre 9/11 and post 9/11. The attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon (as well as the failed attack on Washington DC with the hijacked flight 93), was the culmination of al-Qaeda as a tightly knit, hierarchical organisation. The subsequent “War on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 destroyed much of its organisational capacity; it also left the Taliban severely weakened. However, they both regrouped in the FATA region over a period of years, and al-Qaeda spread its ideology throughout northern Pakistan, coalescing with militant groups and local warlords. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were very much two different organisations; today, it is not so simple, and in 2010, General David Petreus claimed that there is “a symbiotic relationship between all of these different organizations: al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban ... They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each other.” (cfr, 2010, http://www.cfr.org).
Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union, with a centralized leadership structure made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization’s plots either emanated from the top or were approved by the leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to a corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief Executive Officer issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Out of necessity, due to pressures from the security community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. The core leadership, headed by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, is thought to live in the mountainous tribal belt of northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, where it continues to train operatives, recruit, and disseminate propaganda. But Al Qaeda franchises or affiliated groups active in countries such as Yemen and Somalia now represent critical power centers in the larger movement. Some affiliates receive money, training, and weapons; others look to the core leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance, theological justification, and a larger narrative of global struggle.
A l-Qa’ida seems to be on its heels. The death of Osama bin Laden and the fall of Arab dictators have left its leadership in disarray, its narrative confused, and the organization on the defensive. One silver lining for al-Qaida, however, has been its affiliate organizations. In Iraq, the Maghreb, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, alQa’ida has used local groups to expand its reach, increase its power, and grow its numbers. This string of mergers is not over. In places as diverse as the Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria, al-Qa’ida-linked organizations are emerging. However, the jihadist world is more fractured than it may appear at first glance. Many Salafi-jihadist groups have not joined with al-Qa’ida, and even if they have, tensions and divisions occur that present the United States and its allies with opportunities for weakening the bond. at the same time, several Salafi-jihadist groups chose not to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, including Egypt’s Gamaat al-Islamiyya and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and fighters in Chechnya, Gaza, and Pakistan maintained their distance as well. Motivations to the Affiliate for Joining There are a number of reasons why a group may choose to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, some practical, some ideological, and some personal: • • Al-Qa’ida has always been both a group with its own agenda and a facilitator of other terrorist groups. This meant that it not only carried out attacks on U.S. targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen throughout the 1990s, but it helped other jihadist groups with funding, training, and additional logistical essentials. Toward the end of the 1990s, alQa’ida incorporated Egyptian Islamic Jihad into its structure. After September 11, 2001, this process of deepening its relationship with outside groups took off, and today a number of regional groups bear the label “al-Qa’ida” in their name, along with a more local designation.