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Membuat home theater itu memerlukan perencanaan yang matang agar tidak menimbulkan kerugian waktu dan biaya di kemudian hari. Perencanaan itu mencakup home theater design, home theater equipment, dan partisi pendukung lainnya.
Kids Kalma Series is another addition in the series of word by word Interactive Islamic educational apps by Quranreading.com. This app will teach Six Kalma to children using word by word recitation, translation and transliteration of 6 Kalmas of Islam.
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Menguak Risiko, Menggagas Makna Baru Pembangunan Rangkuman dan Temuan-Temuan Utama United Nations UNISDR berterima kasih kepada organisasi-organisasi yang logonya tercantum di bawah ini atas sumbangan finansial dan berarti mereka ntuk penyusunan Laporan Pengkajian Global tentang Pengurangan Risiko Bencana 2011 ini. Selain itu, sumber daya finansial juga telah secara berlimpah disumbangkan oleh, antara lain, Komisi Eropa, dan Pemerintah Jepang, Norwegia, dan Amerika Serikat. Daftar ucapan terima kasih yang lengkap ada di laporan utama. Judul asli: 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction Revealing Risk, Redefining Development © United Nations 2011. Hak cipta dilindungi. Disclaimer: Pandangan-pandangan yang diungkapkan di dalam publikasi ini tidak dengan sendirinya mencerminkan pandangan-pandangan Sekretariat Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (PBB). Penggunaan penyebutan dan penyajian bahan tidak menunjukkan ungkapan pendapat apapun dari Sekretariat PBB tentang status hukum satu negara, teritori, kota atau wilayah, atau pihak-pihak berwenangnya, atau tentang delinenasi garis depan atau perbatasan. Gambar sampul depan: iStockphoto®, © arindambanerjee Penyuntingan, desain, tata letak, dan produksi: Green Ink, Devon, UK Konsep desain: Parsons New School for Design, New York, USA Dicetak oleh: Information Press, Oxford, UK Laporan Pengkajian Global tentang Pengurangan Risiko Bencana 2011 Menguak Risiko, Menggagas Makna Baru Pembangunan Rangkuman dan Temuan-Temuan Utama United Nations Laporan Pengkajian Global tentang Pengurangan Risiko Bencana 2011 (2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction) disusun ketika bencana-bencana terus menyapu bersih hidup dan penghidupan jutaan penduduk di dunia. Dampak gempa bumi yang dahsyat di Haiti pada Januari 2010 dan banjir di Pakistan pada Juli 2010 menunjukkan betapa risiko bencana dan kemiskinan saling berkaitan erat. Sementara itu, pada 2011, banjir di Australia, gempa bumi di Christchurch, Selandia Baru, dan bencana gempa bumi, tsunami dan nuklir di Jepang timur laut yang meluluhlantakkan yang terjadi ketika laporan ini dikirim ke percetakan merupakan pengingat yang sangat tidak menggembirakan betapa negara-negara maju juga sangat terpapar.
Pada hari ini SENiN tanggal ENAMBELAS bulan JULI tahun DUARIBU DUABELAS, yang bertandatangan di bawah ini: Drs. Tarminta, MM : Kepala Pelaksana Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah Kabupaten Kepulauan Mentawai, dalam ha! ini bertindak untuk dan atas nama Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten Kepulauan Mentawai di Jalan Raya Tuapeijat Km. 8, Tuapeijat - Sipora Mentawai, seianjutnya disebut PIHAK KESATU. Dr. Wiwin Ambarwulan : Kepala Pusat Pelayanan Jasa dan Informasi, dalam hal ini bertindak untuk dan atas nama Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional, di Jalan Raya Jakarta - Bogor Km. 46 Cibinong, Jawa Barat, seianjutnya disebut PIHAK KEDUA. PIHAK KESATU dan PIHAK KEDUA yang seianjutnya disebut PARA PIHAK terlebih dahulu mengingat: 1. Undang-Unciang Nomor 20 Tahun 1997 tentang Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1997 Nomor 43, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 3693); 1 dari 6 2. Undang-Untiang Nomor49 Tahun 1999, tanggal 4 Oktober 1999 tentang Pembentukan Kabupaten Kepulauan Mentawai; 3. Undang-Undang Nomor 4 Tahun 2011 tentang Informasi Geospasial (Lembar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2011 Nomor 49, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 5214); 4. Undang-Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2007 tentang Penanggulangan Bencana; 5. Peraturan Pernerintah Nomor 57 Tahun 2007 sebagai pengganti Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 42 Tahun 2001, tentang Jenis dan Tarif atas Jenis Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak yang berlaku pada Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional; 6. Peraturan Presiden Nomor 54 Tahun 2010 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah; 7. Peraturan Menteri Keuangan Nomor: 84/PMK.02/2011 tentang Standar Biaya Tahun Anggaran2012;
In 2007, the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged after the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) aligned itself with Al-Qaeda. This development captured the world’s attention and led several scholars and policymakers to ask the question: Why did this merger take place and what does it say about the motivations of GSPC? This research investigates three hypotheses: (1) This merger is merely an ideological one without operational implications; (2) this merger is ideological, operational, and logistical; or (3) this merger is merely a rebranding of a failing organization that needed to survive and, therefore, is not a genuine threat to the United States and its European allies. Exploring the evolution of Algerian Islamism, from the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to the GSPC and AQIM, this study concludes that hypothesis 3 is the best explanation of the merger between GSPC and Al-Qaeda. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
Why do the Islamic fundamentalists in general—and followers of al Qaeda in particular—resort to terrorist tactics against Americans and other Westerners around the globe? This question has haunted Americans since 9/11 and prompted a host of antiterrorist policies throughout the world. Much has been written and spoken on the subject, and more will be written and spoken in the years ahead. Political geography offers a frame of reference to learn about al Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups and their anti-West, anti–U.S. posture. To explore the point of view propounded by Osama bin Laden and others, this case study uses the ﬁve levels of analysis introduced in chapter three, examined here from a geopolitical perspective. The ﬁve levels of analysis are the: 1) international system, 2) regional, 3) state, 4) substate (tribal groups), and 5) individual. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM LEVEL From the international system perspective, consider the following historical context of al Qaeda’s militant Islam. Militant Islamic fundamentalists and followers of Islam are heirs to one of the great civilizations of the world. While...
Department of History, American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt This article examines the nature of religious terrorism, principally with reference to al-Qaeda. It argues that a distinction must be made between the ultimate aims and the immediate objectives of ‘religious’ terrorists, and that while the ultimate aims will be religiously formulated, the immediate objectives will often be found to be almost purely political. This distinction is illustrated with reference to such premodern religious terrorists as the Assassins and Zealots. Immediate objectives, are for many purposes more important than ultimate aims. Although the immediate objectives of al-Qaeda on 9=11 cannot be established with certainty, it is highly probably that the intention was to provoke a response from the US that would have a radicalizing impact on al-Qaeda’s constituency. Reference to public opinion in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, shows that this is indeed what has happened. Such an impact is a purely political objective, familiar to historians of terrorism from at least the time of Errico Malatesta and the ‘propaganda of the deed’ in the 1870s. While no direct link between Malatesta and al-Qaeda exists, al-Qaeda was certainly in contact with contemporary theories that Malatesta would have recognized, and seems to have applied them. Even though its immediate objectives are political rather than religious, al-Qaeda is a distinctively Islamic group. Not only is its chosen constituency a confessional one, but al-Qaeda also uses—and when necessary adapts—well-known Islamic religious concepts to motivate its operatives, ranging from conceptions of duty to conceptions of ascetic devotion. This is demonstrated with reference to the ‘Last Night’ document of 9=11. The conclusion is that terrorism which can be understood in political terms is susceptible to political remedies.
A l-Qa’ida seems to be on its heels. The death of Osama bin Laden and the fall of Arab dictators have left its leadership in disarray, its narrative confused, and the organization on the defensive. One silver lining for al-Qaida, however, has been its affiliate organizations. In Iraq, the Maghreb, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, alQa’ida has used local groups to expand its reach, increase its power, and grow its numbers. This string of mergers is not over. In places as diverse as the Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria, al-Qa’ida-linked organizations are emerging. However, the jihadist world is more fractured than it may appear at first glance. Many Salafi-jihadist groups have not joined with al-Qa’ida, and even if they have, tensions and divisions occur that present the United States and its allies with opportunities for weakening the bond. at the same time, several Salafi-jihadist groups chose not to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, including Egypt’s Gamaat al-Islamiyya and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and fighters in Chechnya, Gaza, and Pakistan maintained their distance as well. Motivations to the Affiliate for Joining There are a number of reasons why a group may choose to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, some practical, some ideological, and some personal: • • Al-Qa’ida has always been both a group with its own agenda and a facilitator of other terrorist groups. This meant that it not only carried out attacks on U.S. targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen throughout the 1990s, but it helped other jihadist groups with funding, training, and additional logistical essentials. Toward the end of the 1990s, alQa’ida incorporated Egyptian Islamic Jihad into its structure. After September 11, 2001, this process of deepening its relationship with outside groups took off, and today a number of regional groups bear the label “al-Qa’ida” in their name, along with a more local designation.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 have resulted in significant changes in both the geopolitical order of nations and in the lives of billions of citizens across the planet. From two wars and growing instability across the Middle East, to the powers that states are exercising upon each other and their citizens, to your removal of tennis shoes at the airport security gate, the forces unleashed on that dark day are still reverberating throughout the world. In the immediate weeks and months following 9/11, we felt a near-universal sense of horror and intense desire for effective response against the perpetrators of the attacks. We also felt urgency to do so, as another wave of terror seemed possible at any time. The anthrax scare reinforced the imperative that all other restraining considerations should be swept aside in the interests of protecting lives, and regular terror alerts kept apprehension palpable among policy-makers and the public. The psychology of most citizens across the world’s most powerful nation became focused: Islamic terrorism was the new evil, and it demanded an unprecedented response. Aggressive wars were launched, billions in new defense contracts signed, sweeping legislation empowering the executive approved, global and domestic surveillance operations unleashed, and a War President was born. In this climate there was neither political space nor institutional leadership for a proper forensic examination of what actually happened on September 11. It would take extended lobbying by increasingly exasperated family members of victims before any official investigation would be undertaken. Nonetheless, prior to, during and after the tenure of the 9/11 Commission a growing network of researchers developed an increasingly comprehensive map of the situation preceding, upon and following 9/11.