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teks-pidato-islam

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Brosur Buku Pelajaran & Pengayaan FA - Surya EduGASING

kan antara lain buku-buku teks pelajaran berbahasa Indonesia dan bilingual ... Kandel juga menerbitkan buku-buku pengayaan Matematika bagi siswa.

Naravno , prica je o bogumilima je još jedna od iskrivljenih istina nametnuta iz politickih razloga

nikakvog dokaza o masovnom prelasku tzv bogumila u islam nema. Da je toga bilo, naslo bi se masu dokaza među turskim izvorima, a toga tamo nema. Ni jednog jedinog pomena o nekim bogumilima koji masovno prelaze u islam. Ni jednog jedinog

Na tisuce imama predani svojem tradicionalnom islamu su ubijeni od Salafista

Sve vise oni koji su za tradicionalni islam njihovih zajednica dizu glas protiv infiltracije Salafizma, vecinom financiranog od strane Saudijskih Vahabija i drugih zemalja zaljeva. Sada je problem ispao na otvoreno — nema sakrivanja. Ako su Salafisti onda priznaju samo Vahbijsku Meku, ali ne Turski Sufi ili Hanafi Islam. Ili su za Turski Suni Islam, ili su protiv njega. Nema vise uzimanja Saudijskih para kao na Balkanu i Kavkazu (i US geopolitickih ciljeva), a praviti se pro-Turski. Stare zajednice su pocele da se brane — i to uz veliku zrtvu. Na tisuce imama predani svojem tradicionalnom islamu su ubijeni od Salafista. To su Saudijske pare na djelu.

'vatreni' verski vodja moze biti samo Salafista, takva 'vaternost' u propovedanju nije tipcna za Turski Sufi Islam

Problem je, Srpska vlada nikada nezna odoliti iskusenje da se petlja u osjetljivu svetsku politku, i da moze u bitci slonova biti zgazena kao mis. Sutnja je najbolji recept kada nas se nesto ne tice. Srbija nema vladu koja zna proceniti sto se desava, ali nema ni dovoljno uma da trazi savet iz Rusije, pa da onda otvori velika usta. Sto se tu moze. Neznanje, oholost, sujeta i bahatost su nasi grehovi, i moramo ih kao krst nositi na nasoj grbaci. Druge nemamo. Mislim da morate vec poceti da razlikujete Saudijsku Arabiju od Turske, i pokrete koje Saudijska Arabija financira. Turski Gulenovci imaju sjediste u US, i Hizmat pokret je US ispostava. Izetbegovic se kroz Engleski Oxford plasira na Saudijsko trziste para za religiozne pokrete.

Basic Beliefs of Islam
by onlinequrancourses 0 Comments favorite 78 Viewed Download 0 Times

basic book for Muslims kids

Muslimanska Braca su definitivno postala neprijatelj zapada

Mursi je bio toliko siguran u sebe, da je dozvolio posjetu Ahmedinedjada glavnom islamskom centru Egipta -- Al-Azhar.To je centar islamske tradicije Egipta i veliki borac protiv Salafizma, ekstremnog islama. Dugogodisnji vodje tog centra su se obracali narodu da ih obrazuju u islamu. Poucavali su ljude u cinjenici da pokrivananje lica zena nije islam, vec obicaji nekih naroda. Poucavali su ljude protiv zla, kao sto je zensko obrezivanje, sto nema nikakve veze sa islamom, vec je obicaj primitivnih africkih plemena

Cini mi se da je presao na Salafizam, i da samo govori o Otomanskom carstvu da bi pridobio simpatije naroda    to je cista demagogija

Muslimanska Braca su politicki pokret koji je verovao da se bilo koja muslimanska zemlja moze izboriti protiv stranih okupatora i porobljivaca, ako se izbori za politicku vlast. To se zove "politicki islam". Bez obzira na istovetno ime u raznim zemljama, oni NISU PAN-ISLAMISTICKI, vec nacionalisticki. Program im je baziran na sekularnim pitanjima, ne pitanjima religije.

Muslimanska Braca su NACIONALISTI, dok su SALAFISTI orudje Saudijske Arabije

Mursi je stavio odredbu u Ustav koja zahjeva da bilo koji zakon koji uvodi odredbe Serijata, mora da se prvo odobri od EGIPATSKOG SUNI ISLAMSKOG AUTORITETA, AL-AZHAR. A to znaci, da NACIONALNI EGIPATSKI SUNI ISLAM IMA PRAVO DA PONISTI ZAKONE AKO SU U SKLADU SA VAHABIZMOM, ALI NE U SKLADU SA EGIPATSKIM SUNITSKIM SERIJATOM. To je SUSTINA sukoba Salafizma, i Muslimanske Brace.

The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda's Strategy

Small Wars Journal The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda Carl J. Ciovacco Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. More recently, however, al Qaeda appears to be taking stock of the harm that targeting noncombatants is having on its cause. This paper will provide a phased analysis of how al Qaeda’s provision of noncombatant immunity disintegrated over time and why it may be returning today. This progression of thought and action concerning noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and why al Qaeda made these ideological leaps. The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In its evolving mission from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to apostate Muslim regimes in the 1990s, to its current fight against the West, it has employed a variety of tactics in its conduct of war. Against the Soviets and Muslim regimes of Middle East, Northern Africa, and South East Asia, al Qaeda limited its use of force to combatants and government officials. However, in its current fight against the West, and more specifically America, it has shifted its tactics to the targeted killing of noncombatants. What has caused this great shift and departure from past deference to noncombatant immunity? In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately, for the purposes of better understanding this phenomenon, al Qaeda has published much of its reasoning behind its actions. Perhaps more than any other warring party in history, al Qaeda has shared its strategy, tactics, views, and even vulnerabilities for the entire world to see in the global media. 1 It is through these rare glimpses into the psyche of al Qaeda that we can better understand why this shift happened. By placing this shift into five finite phases, we can learn more about the driving factors for the erosion of noncombatant immunity within al Qaeda. Background Before diving into the analysis of the five-phase transition of al Qaeda with respect to noncombatant immunity, it would be prudent to briefly explore two background areas: the leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Islamic Just War ethic. These areas are critical to understanding how bin Laden sees the world and what constraints he operates under when using the cover of Islam for his legitimacy. The contextual importance of understanding the many facets of Islam with respect to war, jihad, and noncombatants cannot be overstated...

Case Study Political Geography and Al Qaeda Terrorism - Cengage ...

Case Study Political Geography and Al Qaeda Terrorism Why do the Islamic fundamentalists in general—and followers of al Qaeda in particular—resort to terrorist tactics against Americans and other Westerners around the globe? This question has haunted Americans since 9/11 and prompted a host of antiterrorist policies throughout the world. Much has been written and spoken on the subject, and more will be written and spoken in the years ahead. Political geography offers a frame of reference to learn about al Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups and their anti-West, anti–U.S. posture. To explore the point of view propounded by Osama bin Laden and others, this case study uses the five levels of analysis introduced in chapter three, examined here from a geopolitical perspective. The five levels of analysis are the: 1) international system, 2) regional, 3) state, 4) substate (tribal groups), and 5) individual. From the international system perspective, consider the following historical context of al Qaeda’s militant Islam. Militant Islamic fundamentalists and followers of Islam are heirs to one of the great civilizations of the world. While today’s Arab Muslims and non-Arab Muslims are in a dire crisis of underdevelopment, poverty, and oppression, yesterday’s Arab Empire was larger than the Roman Empire. The Arab Empire flourished during the seventh through thirteenth centuries. It was truly spectacular (Figures 8.9a and 8.9b). Its achievements—in art, literature, architecture, mathematics, philosophy, medicine, trade, and finance— were profound not only in their time; they left their mark on modern civilization. Moreover, in that era, Muslims, Jews, and Christians coexisted peacefully. Non-Muslims were assured of considerable freedom as well as cultural and intellectual autonomy, as long as they paid a tax. The political geography of the time was dominated by Islam. Then came the eleventh century Crusades, followed by Western colonialism and violent European intervention in the Middle East, creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Western-driven globalization, Westernized greedy rulers and their police states. The twentieth century stands in stark contrast with the glory years of the Arab Empire— and it was an utter disaster from the Arab/Muslim perspective. Elite Middle East rulers, backed by the United States,...

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