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pidato perjuangan nabi muhammad

70 PERSEN KORUPSI INDONESIA DARI PENGADAAN BARANG ...

Indonesia Procurement Watch (IPW) menyatakan dari 385 kasus korupsi i yang ditangani Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), 70 persennya merupakan kasus pengadaan barang dan jasa. "Tingginya angka kasus yang ditangani KPK menjadi indikator proyek pengadaan barang dan jasa merupakan lahan subur praktik korupsi di Indonesia," kata Direktur Program IPW Hayie Muhammad saat menjadi pembicara pelatihan peliputan pengadaan barang dan jasa di Surabaya, Sabtu (6/7). Menurut Hayie Muhammad, selama ini dalam perencanaan pengadaan barang dan jasa di hampir semua kantor pemerintah khususnya daerah, tidak ada pengawasan maksimal sehingga dimanfaatkan oleh pihak-pihak tertentu untuk melakukan keuntungan pribadi. "Umpamanya ada pesanan-pesanan dari pihak-pihak lain seperti Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) untuk memasukkan nilai pekerjaan atau proyek itu di atas Harga Perkiraan Sendiri (HPS)," kata Hayie Muhammad. Itu sebabnya, lanjut Hayie Muhammad, banyak ditemukan bahwa HPS itu lebih mahal dari pada harga pasar yang sebenarnya. "Itulah yang dibagi-bagi mereka untuk sebagai lahan korupsi mereka," katanya. Selama ini, kata dia, proyek pengadaan barang dan jasa menghabiskan anggaran Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (APBN) ii sebesar 30 persen setiap tahunnya, dengan peningkatan sekitar 10 persen per tahun. Selain KPK, kata dia, kejaksaan juga telah mengungkap sekitar 2.000 kasus pengadaan barang dan jasa yang terindikasi korupsi, dengan pemborosan anggaran mencapai 30 hingga 40 persen. Hayie Muhammad menambahkan, proses pengawasan mulai awal perencanaan...

Appendix A: The Financing of the 9/11 Plot

Staff Investigation of the 9/11 Plot The staff’s investigation of the 9/11 plot built on the extensive investigations conducted by the U.S. government, particularly the FBI. The government thoroughly examined the plot’s financial transactions, and the Commission staff had neither the need nor the resources to duplicate that work. Rather, the staff independently assessed the earlier investigation. We had access to the actual evidence of the plotters’ financial transactions, including U.S. and foreign bank account statements, fund transfer records, and other financial records. We also had access to the FBI’s extensive work product, including analyses, financial spreadsheets and timelines, and relevant summaries of interviews with witnesses, such as bank tellers, money exchange operators and others with knowledge of the conspirators’ financial dealings. We were briefed by and formally interviewed the FBI agents who led the plot-financing investigation, sometimes more than once. In addition to the FBI, we met with key people from other agencies, including the CIA and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), who had relevant knowledge about the plot financing. Commission staff also interviewed law enforcement officials from other countries who had investigated the 9/11 plot, reviewed investigative materials from other countries, and interviewed relevant private-sector witnesses. Finally, the staff regularly received relevant reports on the interrogations of the plot participants now in custody. Financing of the Plot To plan and conduct their attack, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000, the vast majority of which was provided by al Qaeda. Although the origin of the funds remains unknown, extensive investigation has revealed quite a bit about the financial transactions that supported the 9/11 plot. The hijackers and their financial facilitators used the anonymity provided by the huge international and domestic financial system to move and store their money through a series of unremarkable transactions. The existing mechanisms to prevent abuse of the financial system did not fail. They were never designed to detect or disrupt transactions of the type that financed 9/11. Financing of the hijackers before they arrived in the United States 131 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Al Qaeda absorbed costs related to the plot before the hijackers arrived in the United States, although our knowledge of the funding during this period remains somewhat murky. According to plot leader Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (KSM), the Hamburg cell members (Muhamad Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Ramzi Binalshibh) each received $5,000 to pay for their return from Afghanistan to Germany in late 1999 or early 2000, after they had been selected to join the plot, and the three Hamburg pilots also received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Once the nonpilot muscle hijackers received their training, each received $2,000 to travel to Saudi Arabia to obtain new passports and visas, and ultimately $10,000 to facilitate travel to the United States, according to KSM.143 We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members received funds from al Qaeda earlier than late 1999. Before then, they appear to have supported themselves. For example, Shehhi was being paid by the UAE military, which was sponsoring his studies in Germany. He continued to receive a salary through December 23, 2000. The funds were deposited into his bank account in the United Arab Emirates and then wired by his...

The Origins of al Qaeda's Ideology - Strategic Studies Institute

“The fight against the enemy nearest to you has precedence over the fight against the enemy farther away. . . . In all Muslim countries the enemy has the reins of power. The enemy is the present rulers.” — Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, tried and hanged in connection with the 1 1981 assassination of Anwar al-Sadat “Victory for the Islamic movements . . . cannot be attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.” — Ayman al-Zawahiri, 2 Bin Laden deputy, 2001 “We do not want stability in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and even Saudi Arabia. . . . The real issue is not whether, but how to destabilize. We have to ensure the fulfillment of the democratic revolution.” — Michael Ledeen, 3 American Enterprise Institute, 2002 T he leader of Sadat’s assassins, Bin Laden’s chief ideologue, and a leading American neoconservative supporter of Israel all call for a revolutionary transformation of the Middle East. However, the United States, the existing Arab regimes, and the traditional Sunni clerical establishments all share an interest in avoiding instability and revolution. This shared interest makes the establishments in the Sunni world America’s natural partners in the struggle against al Qaeda and similar movements. If American strategists fail to understand and exploit the divide between the establishments and the revolutionaries within Sunni Islam, the United States will play into the radicals’ hands, and turn fence-sitting Sunnis into enemies. Spring 2005 69 Outsiders of the Sunni World Sunni Islam is a very big tent, and there always have been insiders and outsiders within Sunnism playing out their rivalries with clashing philosophies.4 Throughout the past century, the most important of these clashes have occurred between Sunni reformers and the traditional Sunni clerical establishment. The ideology espoused today by al Qaeda and similar groups can be traced directly from the 19th-century founders of modernist reform in Sunnism. Al Qaeda’s leading thinkers are steeped in these reformers’ long struggle against the establishment. The teaching of the reformers has been heterodox and revolutionary from the beginning; that is, the reformers and their intellectual descendants in al Qaeda are the outsiders of today’s Sunni world. For the most part this struggle has been waged in Egypt, Sunni Islam’s center of gravity. On one side of the debate, there is Cairo’s Al-Azhar, a seminary and university that has been the center of Sunni orthodoxy for a thousand years. On the other side, al Qaeda’s ideology has its origins in late-19thcentury efforts in Egypt to reform and modernize faith and society. As the 20th century progressed, the Sunni establishment centered on Al-Azhar came to view the modernist reform movement as more and more heterodox. It became known as Salafism, for the supposedly uncorrupted early Muslim predecessors (salaf, plural aslaf ) of today’s Islam. The more revolutionary tendencies in this Salafist reform movement constitute the core of today’s challenge to the Sunni establishment, and are the chief font of al Qaeda’s ideology. A Century of Reformation In contemporary Western discussions of the Muslim world, it is common to hear calls for a “reformation in Islam” as an antidote to al Qaeda.5 These calls often betray a misunderstanding of both Sunni Islam and of the early modern debate between Catholics and Protestants. In fact, a Sunni “reformation” has been under way for more than a century, and it works against Western security interests. The Catholic-Protestant struggle in Europe weakened traditional religious authorities’ control over the definition of doctrine, emphasized scripture over tradition, idealized an allegedly uncorrupted primitive religious community, and simplified theology and rites. The Salafist movement in the Sunni Muslim world has been pursuing these same ...

partai demokrat - KPU
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DAFTAR BAKAL CALON LEGISLATIF TINGKAT PROVINSI SUMATERA UTARA DALAM PEMILU TAHUN 2014 PARTAI POLITIK : PARTAI DEMOKRAT DAERAH PEMILIHAN : SUMUT 1 NO NAMA BAKAL CALON FARIANDA PUTRA SINIK, SE MUHAMMAD YUSUF SIREGAR, SH Hj. MEILIZAR LATIF, SE, MM NURHASANAH, S.Sos ENDA MORA LUBIS, SH Drs. TUNGGUL SIAGIAN NAZLY DALIMUNTHE Ir. MULKAN YAHYA ALI ABDI F. MARBUN EDY SWANDI LAKI-LAKI/PEREMPUAN DAERAH PEMILIHAN : SUMUT 2 NO NAMA BAKAL CALON Drs. TAHAN MANAHAN PANGGABEAN, MM H. ARIFIN NAINGGOLAN FRIDA TETTY H. ARFAN MAKSUM NASUTION LINDA HELMI, SE ROBERT NAINGGOLAN, SE. Ak Drg. IDAWATI NABABAN LAKI-LAKI/PEREMPUAN DAERAH PEMILIHAN : SUMUT 3 NO NAMA BAKAL CALON H.M. DAHRIL SIREGAR, SE GUNTUR MANURUNG, SE Hj. JAMILAH ZAINAL ARIFIN H. MARAHALIM HARAHAP, S.Ag., M.Hum FIKHA MAYSARAH MUFRIZAL, SH SABAM SAGALA Dr. BAHDIN NUR TANJUNG SUHARTINI, S.Sos H. SYAHRIAL TAMBUNAN, MBA Ir. PARLIN MANIHURUK Pdt. METHIA GINTING, SH LAKI-LAKI/PEREMPUAN...

AL-QAEDA AND ANARCHISM: A HISTORIAN'S REPLY TO ...

AL-QAEDA AND ANARCHISM: A HISTORIAN’S REPLY TO TERROROLOGY According to an apocryphal story, Henry Kissinger/André Malraux/an unidentified journalist once asked Chinese premier Zhou Enlai about the significance of the French Revolution. Zhou reportedly replied that it was still too early to tell. Taking this story in its intended spirit, one might reasonably ask the following question: If it is too early to determine the significance of a phenomenon that had occurred a century and a half earlier, is it at all reasonable to attempt to determine the significance of one that is a mere two and a half decades old? More specifically, is it possible for historians and other social scientists writing six years after the attacks of 9/11 (when most turned their attention to the problem) to typologize and historicize the phenomenon of jihadi movements such as al-Qaeda? Zhou’s reported caution aside, it is not as if the freshness of the phenomenon has prevented everyone from journalists to historians to specialists in the newly reinvigorated field of “terrorology” from weighing in on the issue. Some have chosen to view contemporary jihadi movements as a phenomenon sui generis; for others, they are variations on one or another historical theme. Putting aside for the moment the “what went wrong” school of analysis, which presents jihadi movements as a manifestation or the logical culmination of a civilization gone bad,1 two styles of sui generis narrative appear with some regularity. First, there are those accounts that focus on the genealogy of jihadi movements by applying a traditional history-of-ideas methodology. In these accounts, ideas evolve one from the other in a linear and progressive manner, somehow radiating their influence across time and generations. Thus, the family tree of contemporary jihadi movements most frequently begins with ibn Taymiyya and runs through Muhammad ibn Wahhab, Mawlani Abul A’la Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad al-Faraj, and Abdullah Azzam until it reaches Omar Abdul Rahman (“the blind sheikh”), Ayman Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden.2 Like all traditional history-ofideas narratives, this one attempts to make up for what it lacks in sufficiency with an overabundance of necessity. (As will be seen below, a stronger case might be made for replacing the progressive chronological sequence with one that starts with bin Laden and continues back in time through ibn Taymiyya, and substituting the words “selected and drew from” for “influenced.”) Others have attempted to address this shortcoming by affixing to their narratives contingent external events that, they claim, have increased the availability of or receptivity to proto-jihadi or jihadi ideas. Thus, the now-familiar stories of a drunk American woman’s abortive shipboard seduction of Sayyid Qutb (and the Cairene’s reputed and less than convincing shock at the loose, small-town American values of the late 1940s [!]), the petrodollar-backed spread of Wahhabi doctrines, the hothouse atmosphere of Nasser’s and Mubarak’s jails, and America’s covert support of ArabAfghan mujahidin fighting the Soviet Union.3 Unfortunately, accounting for the resonance of jihadi ideology (instead of, say, the Islamo-nationalism represented by Hamas or Hizbullah or a more “traditional” Islamist ideology such as that espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) remains a problem here as well...

11 September 2001 Hijackers
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AA Flight 77 UA Flight 175 AA Flight 11 11 September 2001 Hijackers Full Name: Muhammed Muhammed el-Amir Awad al-Sayed Atta Full Name: Ustam bin Muhammad Abd al-Rahman al-Saqami Date Arrived in US: 3 June 2000 Date Arrived in US: 29 June 2001 Date Arrived in US: 23 April 2001 Arrival City in US: Newark, NJ Arrival City in US: New York, NY Arrival City in US: Orlando, FL Nationality: Egyptian Nationality: Saudi Residence in US: Florida Residence in US: New Jersey/ Florida Full Name: Marwan Yousef Muhammed Rashid Lekrab al-Shehhi Nationality: Saudi Residence in US: Florida DOB: 31 July 1973 (28 years old) DOB: 28 June 1976 (25 years old) Satam al-Suqami Wail al-Shehri DOB: 20 Dec 1978 (22 years old) Walid al-Shehri Full Name: Ahmad Salih Said al-Kurshi al-Ghamdi Full Name: Fayez Rashid Ahmad Banihammad Full Name: Hamza Salih Ahmad Date represents entry we believe is related to 11 September attacks, but Hanjur, unlike the other suspected hijackers, had traveled in and out of the US since 1991...

Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to - Infoshop.org

• AL-QAEDA AND ANARCHISM: A HISTORIAN’S REPLY TO TERROROLOGY James L. Gelvin Department of History University of California, Los Angeles According to an apocryphal story, Henry Kissinger/André Malraux/an unidentified journalist once asked Chinese premier Zhou Enlai about the significance of the French Revolution. Zhou reportedly replied that it was still too early to tell. Taking this story in its intended spirit, one might reasonably ask the following question: If it is too early to determine the significance of a phenomenon that had occurred a century and a half earlier, is it at all reasonable to attempt to determine the significance of one that is a mere two and a half decades old? More specifically, is it possible for historians and other social scientists writing six years after the attacks of 9/11 (when most turned their attention to the problem) to typologize and historicize the phenomenon of jihadi movements such as al-Qaeda? Zhou’s reported caution aside, it is not as if the freshness of the phenomenon has prevented everyone from journalists to historians to specialists in the newly reinvigorated field of “terrorology” from weighing in on the issue. Some have chosen to view contemporary jihadi movements as a phenomenon sui generis; for others, they are variations on one or another historical theme. Putting aside for the moment the “what went wrong” school of analysis, which presents jihadi movements as a manifestation or the logical culmination of a civilization gone bad,1 two styles of sui generis narrative appear with some regularity. First, there are those accounts that focus on the genealogy of jihadi movements by applying a traditional history-of-ideas methodology. In these accounts, ideas evolve one from the other in a linear and progressive manner, somehow radiating their influence across time and generations. Thus, the family tree of contemporary jihadi movements most frequently begins with ibn Taymiyya and runs through Muhammad ibn Wahhab, Mawlani Abul A’la Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad al-Faraj, and Abdullah Azzam until it reaches Omar Abdul Rahman (“the blind sheikh”), Ayman Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden.2 Like all traditional history-ofideas narratives, this one attempts to make up for what it lacks in sufficiency with an overabundance of necessity. (As will be seen below, a stronger case might be made for replacing the progressive chronological sequence with one that starts with bin Laden and continues back in time through ibn Taymiyya, and substituting the words “selected and drew from” for “influenced.”) Others have attempted to address this shortcoming by affixing to their narratives contingent external events that, they claim, have increased the availability of or receptivity to proto-jihadi or jihadi ideas. Thus, the now-familiar stories of a drunk American woman’s abortive shipboard seduction of Sayyid Qutb (and the Cairene’s reputed and less than convincing shock at the loose, small-town American values of the late 1940s [!]), the petrodollar-backed spread of Wahhabi doctrines, the hothouse atmosphere of Nasser’s and Mubarak’s jails, and America’s covert support of ArabAfghan mujahidin fighting the Soviet Union.3 Unfortunately, accounting for the resonance of jihadi ideology (instead of, say, the Islamo-nationalism represented by Hamas or Hizbullah or a more “traditional” Islamist ideology such as that espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) remains a problem here as well...

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FORUM - Pacific Lutheran University

Muhammad Yunus. Nobel Peace Prize winner Banker to the poor and father of microlending. Friday, March 8. 10:30-11:30am. Location TBD. Dr. Paul Farmer ...

PDIP Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Indonesian Democracy ...

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle ... The result led to the election of Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono promoted by the Demokrat ...

Siswa Asia memboikot Sekolah South Philadelphia

Kasus Imigrasi - Kasus Asylum - Witholding Removal - BIA ... an sikap, antara lain Indonesia harus bersih dari korupsi dan tak cukup lewat pidato, bersih dari koruptor kasus ...

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