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Counteroffer Acceptance: Road to Career Ruin by Paul Hawkinson Matthew Henry, the 17th century writer said, “Many a dangerous temptation comes to us in fine gay colors that are but skin deep.” The same can be said for counteroffers, those magnetic enticements designed to lure you back into the nest after you've decided it's time to fly away. The litany of horror stories I've come across in my years as an executive recruiter, consultant and publisher, provides a litmus test that clearly indicates counteroffers should never be accepted . . . EVER! I define a counteroffer simply as an inducement from your current employer to get you to stay after you've announced your intention to take another job. We're not talking about those instances when you receive an offer but don't tell your boss. Nor are we discussing offers that you never intended to take, yet tell your employer about anyway as a “”they-want-me-but-I'mwith-you” ploy. These are merely astute positioning tactics you may choose to use to reinforce your worth by letting your boss know you have other options. Mention of a true offer, however, carries an actual threat to quit. Interviews with employers who make counteroffers, and employees who accept them, have shown that as tempting as they may be, acceptance may cause career suicide. During the past 20 years, I've seen only isolated incidents in which an accepted counteroffer has benefited the employee. Consider the problem in its proper perspective. What really goes through a boss's mind when someone quits?
Today the Wall Street Journal published a letter to the editor from Commission chair Judge Patti B. Saris regarding Mortimer Zuckerman’s op-ed “Harsh Sentencing, Overstuffed Prisons—It’s Time for Reform” (May 3, 2014): Sentencing Guidelines Are Being Intelligently Adjusted The amendment originated with the U.S. Sentencing Commission and is something we carefully considered over several years. Regarding Mortimer Zuckerman’s “Harsh Sentencing, Overstuffed Prisons—It’s Time for Reform” (op-ed, May 3): Mr. Zuckerman mentions a Justice Department sentencing panel proposing an amendment to federal guidelines. In fact, it was the U.S. Sentencing Commission, an independent, bipartisan agency that is part of the judicial branch, which voted unanimously on April 10 to amend the federal sentencing guidelines to modestly reduce sentences for the majority of federal drug offenders. We appreciated the support for this change from the Justice Department and others ranging from bipartisan members of Congress to the Federal Public and Community Defenders to Right on Crime, but the amendment originated with the commission and is something we carefully considered over several years. This amendment has been transmitted to Congress and unless Congress acts to disapprove, it will go into effect Nov. 1, 2014. The federal sentencing guidelines are advisory but carry substantial weight in determining federal sentences. The amendment reduces the guideline levels assigned to most drug-trafficking offenders based on the quantity of drugs involved in the offense. The commission determined that the guideline levels for drug quantity no longer needed to be so high. We estimate that our amendment will affect the sentences of almost 70% of federal drugtrafficking offenders and reduce their sentences by 11 months on average. These sentence reductions will correspond to a reduction in the federal prison population of approximately 6,500 inmates within five years and many more over time. The commission carefully weighed public safety concerns, and based on past experience, existing laws and guidelines and expert testimony it concluded that the amendment should not jeopardize public safety. Our amendment is modest in scope; only Congress can change statutory mandatory minimum penalties. But we believe it is an important start.
This paper examines the complex, often misunderstood, relationship between al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the various militant groups found in FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in Pakistan, including the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan). Much of what is commonly assumed about the Taliban, the TTP and al-Qaeda is based on misinformation, misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of historical events. The Taliban and alQaeda can in many ways be seen as sharing common values, although their ultimate goals remain very different. The Taliban were not part of the mujahedeen fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and emerged only in 1994. Al-Qaeda, for all the conspiracy, did not receive money from the CIA during the 1980s, and was only officially formed as an organisation in 1988. The creation of the TTP in 2007 is another matter, and was created as an umbrella organisation for various Pakistani militant groups, and maintains close ties with al-Qaeda. However, the Pakistani Taliban is not the same Taliban as the one formed in 1994, and although it swears its loyalty to Mullah Omar, its goals differ from that of the Afghani Taliban. We can speak of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in two broad strokes – pre 9/11 and post 9/11. The attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon (as well as the failed attack on Washington DC with the hijacked flight 93), was the culmination of al-Qaeda as a tightly knit, hierarchical organisation. The subsequent “War on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 destroyed much of its organisational capacity; it also left the Taliban severely weakened. However, they both regrouped in the FATA region over a period of years, and al-Qaeda spread its ideology throughout northern Pakistan, coalescing with militant groups and local warlords. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were very much two different organisations; today, it is not so simple, and in 2010, General David Petreus claimed that there is “a symbiotic relationship between all of these different organizations: al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban ... They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each other.” (cfr, 2010, http://www.cfr.org).
Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union, with a centralized leadership structure made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization’s plots either emanated from the top or were approved by the leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to a corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief Executive Officer issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Out of necessity, due to pressures from the security community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. The core leadership, headed by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, is thought to live in the mountainous tribal belt of northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, where it continues to train operatives, recruit, and disseminate propaganda. But Al Qaeda franchises or affiliated groups active in countries such as Yemen and Somalia now represent critical power centers in the larger movement. Some affiliates receive money, training, and weapons; others look to the core leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance, theological justification, and a larger narrative of global struggle.
In 2007, the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged after the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) aligned itself with Al-Qaeda. This development captured the world’s attention and led several scholars and policymakers to ask the question: Why did this merger take place and what does it say about the motivations of GSPC? This research investigates three hypotheses: (1) This merger is merely an ideological one without operational implications; (2) this merger is ideological, operational, and logistical; or (3) this merger is merely a rebranding of a failing organization that needed to survive and, therefore, is not a genuine threat to the United States and its European allies. Exploring the evolution of Algerian Islamism, from the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to the GSPC and AQIM, this study concludes that hypothesis 3 is the best explanation of the merger between GSPC and Al-Qaeda. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
Department of History, American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt This article examines the nature of religious terrorism, principally with reference to al-Qaeda. It argues that a distinction must be made between the ultimate aims and the immediate objectives of ‘religious’ terrorists, and that while the ultimate aims will be religiously formulated, the immediate objectives will often be found to be almost purely political. This distinction is illustrated with reference to such premodern religious terrorists as the Assassins and Zealots. Immediate objectives, are for many purposes more important than ultimate aims. Although the immediate objectives of al-Qaeda on 9=11 cannot be established with certainty, it is highly probably that the intention was to provoke a response from the US that would have a radicalizing impact on al-Qaeda’s constituency. Reference to public opinion in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, shows that this is indeed what has happened. Such an impact is a purely political objective, familiar to historians of terrorism from at least the time of Errico Malatesta and the ‘propaganda of the deed’ in the 1870s. While no direct link between Malatesta and al-Qaeda exists, al-Qaeda was certainly in contact with contemporary theories that Malatesta would have recognized, and seems to have applied them. Even though its immediate objectives are political rather than religious, al-Qaeda is a distinctively Islamic group. Not only is its chosen constituency a confessional one, but al-Qaeda also uses—and when necessary adapts—well-known Islamic religious concepts to motivate its operatives, ranging from conceptions of duty to conceptions of ascetic devotion. This is demonstrated with reference to the ‘Last Night’ document of 9=11. The conclusion is that terrorism which can be understood in political terms is susceptible to political remedies.
A l-Qa’ida seems to be on its heels. The death of Osama bin Laden and the fall of Arab dictators have left its leadership in disarray, its narrative confused, and the organization on the defensive. One silver lining for al-Qaida, however, has been its affiliate organizations. In Iraq, the Maghreb, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, alQa’ida has used local groups to expand its reach, increase its power, and grow its numbers. This string of mergers is not over. In places as diverse as the Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria, al-Qa’ida-linked organizations are emerging. However, the jihadist world is more fractured than it may appear at first glance. Many Salafi-jihadist groups have not joined with al-Qa’ida, and even if they have, tensions and divisions occur that present the United States and its allies with opportunities for weakening the bond. at the same time, several Salafi-jihadist groups chose not to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, including Egypt’s Gamaat al-Islamiyya and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and fighters in Chechnya, Gaza, and Pakistan maintained their distance as well. Motivations to the Affiliate for Joining There are a number of reasons why a group may choose to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, some practical, some ideological, and some personal: • • Al-Qa’ida has always been both a group with its own agenda and a facilitator of other terrorist groups. This meant that it not only carried out attacks on U.S. targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen throughout the 1990s, but it helped other jihadist groups with funding, training, and additional logistical essentials. Toward the end of the 1990s, alQa’ida incorporated Egyptian Islamic Jihad into its structure. After September 11, 2001, this process of deepening its relationship with outside groups took off, and today a number of regional groups bear the label “al-Qa’ida” in their name, along with a more local designation.
Setting up Charging the rechargeable battery pack Setting up the rechargeable battery pack 1 Press the tab on the top of the controller’s battery compartment cover, then and pull down to detach the original battery from the controller. Charge your battery pack before its first use and whenever it is drained. 1 Insert the charging plug into the charge port on the front of your wireless controller. 2 Connect the USB plug to any USB port of your Xbox 360. 3 Turn on your console. The charge indicator on the front of the plug glows red as the battery pack charges. When the light glows green, the battery pack is fully charged. Rechargeable battery safety Incorrect battery use may result in battery leakage, overheating, or explosion. When using batteries, make sure that you follow these instructions: • Keep batteries out of reach of children. • Do not heat, open, puncture, mutilate, or dispose of batteries in fire. • If a battery leaks, remove the battery, taking care to keep the leaked fluid from touching your skin or clothes. If fluid from the battery comes into contact with skin or clothes, flush skin with water or remove the clothing immediately. Before inserting a new battery, thoroughly clean the controller with a damp paper towel. • Do not allow metal objects to touch the battery terminals, because they can become hot and cause burns. For example, do not carry the battery in a pocket with keys or coins. • Remove the battery when the product will not be used for an extended period of time.
• Provides up to 30 hours of playtime with a fully charged battery.* • Recharges in as little as 4 hours.* • Play and recharge the battery pack at the same time. * See “Important Information” on page 7 for limitations. 2 1 Install battery pack Insert the battery pack into your controller, metal contact end first. Press the battery pack to snap into place. Controller 3 2 Charge battery pack 1. Turn on your Xbox 360 console. 2. Connect one end of the charging cable to your controller. Indicator Red: Charging Green: Fully charged 4 Turn on 3. Connect the other end to your Xbox 360 console’s USB port. 4. When the battery pack is fully charged, unplug the charging cable from your controller and console. w Caution: Do not connect the charging cable if a non-rechargeable battery pack is installed. This may damage the controller.