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“The fight against the enemy nearest to you has precedence over the fight against the enemy farther away. . . . In all Muslim countries the enemy has the reins of power. The enemy is the present rulers.” — Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, tried and hanged in connection with the 1 1981 assassination of Anwar al-Sadat “Victory for the Islamic movements . . . cannot be attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.” — Ayman al-Zawahiri, 2 Bin Laden deputy, 2001 “We do not want stability in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and even Saudi Arabia. . . . The real issue is not whether, but how to destabilize. We have to ensure the fulfillment of the democratic revolution.” — Michael Ledeen, 3 American Enterprise Institute, 2002 T he leader of Sadat’s assassins, Bin Laden’s chief ideologue, and a leading American neoconservative supporter of Israel all call for a revolutionary transformation of the Middle East. However, the United States, the existing Arab regimes, and the traditional Sunni clerical establishments all share an interest in avoiding instability and revolution. This shared interest makes the establishments in the Sunni world America’s natural partners in the struggle against al Qaeda and similar movements. If American strategists fail to understand and exploit the divide between the establishments and the revolutionaries within Sunni Islam, the United States will play into the radicals’ hands, and turn fence-sitting Sunnis into enemies. Spring 2005 69 Outsiders of the Sunni World Sunni Islam is a very big tent, and there always have been insiders and outsiders within Sunnism playing out their rivalries with clashing philosophies.4 Throughout the past century, the most important of these clashes have occurred between Sunni reformers and the traditional Sunni clerical establishment. The ideology espoused today by al Qaeda and similar groups can be traced directly from the 19th-century founders of modernist reform in Sunnism. Al Qaeda’s leading thinkers are steeped in these reformers’ long struggle against the establishment. The teaching of the reformers has been heterodox and revolutionary from the beginning; that is, the reformers and their intellectual descendants in al Qaeda are the outsiders of today’s Sunni world. For the most part this struggle has been waged in Egypt, Sunni Islam’s center of gravity. On one side of the debate, there is Cairo’s Al-Azhar, a seminary and university that has been the center of Sunni orthodoxy for a thousand years. On the other side, al Qaeda’s ideology has its origins in late-19thcentury efforts in Egypt to reform and modernize faith and society. As the 20th century progressed, the Sunni establishment centered on Al-Azhar came to view the modernist reform movement as more and more heterodox. It became known as Salafism, for the supposedly uncorrupted early Muslim predecessors (salaf, plural aslaf ) of today’s Islam. The more revolutionary tendencies in this Salafist reform movement constitute the core of today’s challenge to the Sunni establishment, and are the chief font of al Qaeda’s ideology. A Century of Reformation In contemporary Western discussions of the Muslim world, it is common to hear calls for a “reformation in Islam” as an antidote to al Qaeda.5 These calls often betray a misunderstanding of both Sunni Islam and of the early modern debate between Catholics and Protestants. In fact, a Sunni “reformation” has been under way for more than a century, and it works against Western security interests. The Catholic-Protestant struggle in Europe weakened traditional religious authorities’ control over the definition of doctrine, emphasized scripture over tradition, idealized an allegedly uncorrupted primitive religious community, and simplified theology and rites. The Salafist movement in the Sunni Muslim world has been pursuing these same ...
There are many models in the entire history of architecture which have travelled across the world, from one to another part of the big world. For various reasons, very frequently not at all scientific or professional, in our part of the world, be it Serbian or Yugoslav, or south Slav, some like to remain silent, when it comes to the transition of a Byzantine model, which by nature is rooted in the Orthodox Christian faith at the south east of Europe and the outmost west of Asia, to their areas, pervaded to a great extent by the Roman Catholic Christian belief, or Islam. There are numerous evidences of the transition of a model, one of many which found their new home on the west-European soil after the fall of Byzantium, mostly after the Crusades, when looters, but also scientists and artists in Italy, came by new wealth, and new knowledge, in the capital of the fallen Empire, observing its magnificent edifices, and taking its parts to their boats and shipping them to Venice and other cities in Italy and placing them on their buildings and squares, as they have done with the columns of the Augusteion of Constantinople, the square dedicated to Justinian's mother Augusta, which now decorate the square near the famous Venetian church of Saint Marco. Some other, also numerous accounts, explain how the Ottoman Turkish architecture in almost the same way, adopted its mosque construction model at the same place, in the same manner, retaining the actual structures but changing the religious insignia, or by copying this Byzantine model in building the new mosques. Key words: Early Christianity, Byzantium, documents, theory of architecture. ...
nikakvog dokaza o masovnom prelasku tzv bogumila u islam nema. Da je toga bilo, naslo bi se masu dokaza među turskim izvorima, a toga tamo nema. Ni jednog jedinog pomena o nekim bogumilima koji masovno prelaze u islam. Ni jednog jedinog
Sve vise oni koji su za tradicionalni islam njihovih zajednica dizu glas protiv infiltracije Salafizma, vecinom financiranog od strane Saudijskih Vahabija i drugih zemalja zaljeva. Sada je problem ispao na otvoreno — nema sakrivanja. Ako su Salafisti onda priznaju samo Vahbijsku Meku, ali ne Turski Sufi ili Hanafi Islam. Ili su za Turski Suni Islam, ili su protiv njega. Nema vise uzimanja Saudijskih para kao na Balkanu i Kavkazu (i US geopolitickih ciljeva), a praviti se pro-Turski. Stare zajednice su pocele da se brane — i to uz veliku zrtvu. Na tisuce imama predani svojem tradicionalnom islamu su ubijeni od Salafista. To su Saudijske pare na djelu.
Problem je, Srpska vlada nikada nezna odoliti iskusenje da se petlja u osjetljivu svetsku politku, i da moze u bitci slonova biti zgazena kao mis. Sutnja je najbolji recept kada nas se nesto ne tice. Srbija nema vladu koja zna proceniti sto se desava, ali nema ni dovoljno uma da trazi savet iz Rusije, pa da onda otvori velika usta. Sto se tu moze. Neznanje, oholost, sujeta i bahatost su nasi grehovi, i moramo ih kao krst nositi na nasoj grbaci. Druge nemamo. Mislim da morate vec poceti da razlikujete Saudijsku Arabiju od Turske, i pokrete koje Saudijska Arabija financira. Turski Gulenovci imaju sjediste u US, i Hizmat pokret je US ispostava. Izetbegovic se kroz Engleski Oxford plasira na Saudijsko trziste para za religiozne pokrete.
Mursi je bio toliko siguran u sebe, da je dozvolio posjetu Ahmedinedjada glavnom islamskom centru Egipta -- Al-Azhar.To je centar islamske tradicije Egipta i veliki borac protiv Salafizma, ekstremnog islama. Dugogodisnji vodje tog centra su se obracali narodu da ih obrazuju u islamu. Poucavali su ljude u cinjenici da pokrivananje lica zena nije islam, vec obicaji nekih naroda. Poucavali su ljude protiv zla, kao sto je zensko obrezivanje, sto nema nikakve veze sa islamom, vec je obicaj primitivnih africkih plemena
Muslimanska Braca su politicki pokret koji je verovao da se bilo koja muslimanska zemlja moze izboriti protiv stranih okupatora i porobljivaca, ako se izbori za politicku vlast. To se zove "politicki islam". Bez obzira na istovetno ime u raznim zemljama, oni NISU PAN-ISLAMISTICKI, vec nacionalisticki. Program im je baziran na sekularnim pitanjima, ne pitanjima religije.
Mursi je stavio odredbu u Ustav koja zahjeva da bilo koji zakon koji uvodi odredbe Serijata, mora da se prvo odobri od EGIPATSKOG SUNI ISLAMSKOG AUTORITETA, AL-AZHAR. A to znaci, da NACIONALNI EGIPATSKI SUNI ISLAM IMA PRAVO DA PONISTI ZAKONE AKO SU U SKLADU SA VAHABIZMOM, ALI NE U SKLADU SA EGIPATSKIM SUNITSKIM SERIJATOM. To je SUSTINA sukoba Salafizma, i Muslimanske Brace.
Small Wars Journal The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda Carl J. Ciovacco Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. More recently, however, al Qaeda appears to be taking stock of the harm that targeting noncombatants is having on its cause. This paper will provide a phased analysis of how al Qaeda’s provision of noncombatant immunity disintegrated over time and why it may be returning today. This progression of thought and action concerning noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and why al Qaeda made these ideological leaps. The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In its evolving mission from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to apostate Muslim regimes in the 1990s, to its current fight against the West, it has employed a variety of tactics in its conduct of war. Against the Soviets and Muslim regimes of Middle East, Northern Africa, and South East Asia, al Qaeda limited its use of force to combatants and government officials. However, in its current fight against the West, and more specifically America, it has shifted its tactics to the targeted killing of noncombatants. What has caused this great shift and departure from past deference to noncombatant immunity? In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately, for the purposes of better understanding this phenomenon, al Qaeda has published much of its reasoning behind its actions. Perhaps more than any other warring party in history, al Qaeda has shared its strategy, tactics, views, and even vulnerabilities for the entire world to see in the global media. 1 It is through these rare glimpses into the psyche of al Qaeda that we can better understand why this shift happened. By placing this shift into five finite phases, we can learn more about the driving factors for the erosion of noncombatant immunity within al Qaeda. Background Before diving into the analysis of the five-phase transition of al Qaeda with respect to noncombatant immunity, it would be prudent to briefly explore two background areas: the leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Islamic Just War ethic. These areas are critical to understanding how bin Laden sees the world and what constraints he operates under when using the cover of Islam for his legitimacy. The contextual importance of understanding the many facets of Islam with respect to war, jihad, and noncombatants cannot be overstated...