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SolidWorks Electrical Installing SolidWorks Electrical SolidWorks Electrical installation files are available on DVD-ROM or via download. They provide two distinct software installations: • • SolidWorks Electrical SolidWorks Electrical 3D Please note that regardless of whether a Standalone or Client Server installation type has been selected certain processes will be the same, namely if a new SQL instance is to be installed, or if an existing SQL server has been detected. To reduce the size of the document links have been provided to common procedures. 1. Configuration requirements 1.1. SQL data server SolidWorks Electrical includes SQL Server 2008 Express in the installation; this is used to store of the program intelligence, manufacturers’ parts, library symbol descriptions etc. 1.2. System requirements Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8 (x64 only). Memory (minimum): 2GB of RAM, 3GB for Windows Vista. Hard disk (minimum): 3GB free space, (for data, server or standalone) + 200MB for the application. Important note for Microsoft Office 2010 users: The 64 bit version of SolidWorks Electrical is not compatible with Microsoft Office 2010 32 bit, when installed on a 64 bit machine. To run SolidWorks Electrical (64 bit version) with Microsoft Office 2010 you must have the 64 bit version of Microsoft Office 2010 installed. (Please note also: Microsoft Office is not required to run SolidWorks Electrical software.) 1.2.1. SolidWorks Electrical 3D/Professional In order to ensure that you have valid system requirements please refer to the page: www.solidworks.com/SystemRequirements.html 3 3DS.COM © Dassault Systèmes | Confidential Information | 01/02/2012 ref.: Document_Reference | This document details the installation of SolidWorks Electrical in either “Standalone” or “Client Server” modes. SolidWorks Electrical is compatible with SolidWorks version 2013 and higher. 3DS.COM © Dassault Systèmes | Confidential Information | 01/02/2012 ref.: Document_Reference | SolidWorks Electrical 3D does not require SolidWorks Routing, (or Premium), to be purchased separately unless you intend to design piping and tubing. 4 Installation instructions Fundamentals To successfully complete the installation, it is essential that the Windows session is run with full Administrator privileges. The "Standalone" installation allows the user to run the software on a single workstation. The databases will be installed locally and are not shared. The "Client Server" installation allows users to share data (symbols, catalogues…) so that several users can work on the same projects data set. When using the downloaded installation run the "Install_sw-e" file. Running the exe file will unpack the contents and automatically launch the installation. Note that the data should not be installed to a root directory, (C:\ for example). A unique directory should be used to store the data, (C:\SolidWorksElectricalData for example). Additionally the SolidWorks Electrical data should not be installed into the same folder as the SolidWorks data. The Setup program automatically recognizes the operating system language and will switch the installation interface to that language. It also detects the presence of any previously installed SolidWorks Electrical on the computer and adapts the interface accordingly. Agreement/Registration On launching the Setup program, if no existing instance of SolidWorks Electrical is located on your system, you will be prompted to accept to the software license agreement. Check on the Accept check box and click the "Next" button to continue. Enter your contact information, and serial number then click the "Next" button to continue. 5 3DS.COM © Dassault Systèmes | Confidential Information | 01/02/2012 ref.: Document_Reference | The client server installation must be run on the computer identified as the "Server".
AUTO-SCAN FM RADIO KIT MODEL FM-88K ELENCO® 150 Carpenter Avenue Wheeling, IL 60090 (847) 541-3800 Website: www.elenco.com e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org To see our complete line of Educational Products go to WWW.ELENCO.COM Assembly and Instruction Manual ELENCO ® Copyright © 2011 by ELENCO® All rights reserved. No part of this book shall be reproduced by any means; electronic, photocopying, or otherwise without written permission from the publisher. 753050 PARTS LIST GLOSSARY (Continued) If you are a student, and any parts are missing or damaged, please see instructor or bookstore. If you purchased this kit from a distributor, catalog, etc., please contact ELENCO® (address/phone/e-mail is at the back of this manual) for additional assistance, if needed. DO NOT contact your place of purchase as they will not be able to help you. RF Radio Frequency. Sensitivity The ability of a receiver to pick up low-amplitude signals. Speaker An electronic device that turn electric impulses into sound. Surface-mount Technology RESISTORS Symbol R5 R1 R3 R4 R2 R6/S3 Value Color Code 10Ω 5% 1/4W brown-black-black-gold 680Ω 5% 1/4W blue-gray-brown-gold 5.6kΩ 5% 1/4W green-blue-red-gold 10kΩ 5% 1/4W brown-black-orange-gold 18kΩ 5% 1/4W brown-gray-orange-gold Potentiometer 50kΩ & switch w/ nut & washer Part # 121000 136800 145600 151000 151800 192522 CAPACITORS Qty. r1 r1 r1 r1 r1 r1 r1 r1 r2 r1 r1 r6 r2 r1 r1 r2 Symbol C6 C7 C10 C5 C8 C4 C13 C23 C11, C12 C15 C19 C3, C9, C14, C16, C17, C* C21, C22 C20 C1 C2, C18 Value 33pF 82pF 180pF 220pF 330pF 470pF 680pF 1500pF 3300pF 0.033μF 0.047μF 0.1μF 10μF 22μF 100μF 220μF Description Discap (33) Discap (82) Discap (181 or 180) Discap (221 or 220) Discap (331 or 330) Discap (471 or 470) Discap (681 or 680) Discap (152) Discap (332) Discap (333) Discap (473) Discap (104) Electrolytic radial Electrolytic radial Electrolytic radial Electrolytic radial Part # 213317 218210 221810 222210 223317 224717 226880 231516 233310 243318 244780 251010 271044 272244 281044 282244 COILS Qty. r1 r1 Symbol L2 L1 Value Qty. r1 r1 r1 r1 r1 Symbol D1 D2 D3 U2 U1 Description Coil 4-turn Coil 6-turn Value BB909/BB910 1N4001 Part # 430150 430160 SEMICONDUCTORS LM-386 or identical TDA7088T or identical Description Varactor Semiconductor silicon diode Red LED 3mm Low voltage audio power amplifier FM receiver SM installed on PC board Part # 310909 314001 350003 330386 MISCELLANEOUS Qty. r1 r1 r2 r1 r1 r1 r1 r1 Description Antenna FM PC board w/ installed U1 (TDA7088T) Push button switch 12mm Battery holder Speaker 8Ω Cap push button switch yellow Cap push button switch red Knob pot / switch Qty. r1 r2 r1 r1 r1 r 3” r1 Part # 484005 517038 540005 590096 590102 622001 622007 622050 -1- Description Screw M1.8 x 7.5mm Antenna screw M2 x 5mm Nut M1.8 Socket IC 8-pin Speaker pad Wire 22 ga. solid Solder Lead-free Part # 641100 643148 644210 664008 780128 834012 9LF99 Trimmer A semiconductor component that can be used to amplify signals, or as electronic switches. Varactor A method of using special components that are soldered to the PC board’s surface. A diode optimized to vary its internal capacitance with a change in its reverse bias voltage. Voltage Electrical potential difference measured in volts. An adjustable fine-tuning resistor, capacitor, or inductor of small values. Voltage Regulator A circuit that holds the DC voltage. QUIZ INSTRUCTIONS: Complete the following examination, check your answers carefully. 6. The capacitance of the varactor is determined by . . . r A) the voltage level. r B) the amount of current in the circuit. r C) the signal strength of the RF carrier. r D) the amount of resistance in the circuit. 1. The number of cycles produced per second by a source of sound is called the . . . r A) amplitude. r B) vibration. r C) sound wave. r D) frequency. 7. The ability to select a specific band of frequencies, while rejecting others, is called . . . r A) selectivity. r B) sensitivity. r C) demodulation. r D) none of the above. 2. The frequency of the modulating signal determines the ... r A) number of times the frequency of the carrier changes per second. r B) maximum deviation of the FM carrier. r C) maximum frequency swing of the FM carrier. r D) amount of amplitude change of the FM carrier. 8. The process of mixing two signals to produce a third signal is called . . . r A) filtering. r B) detecting. r C) rectification. r D) heterodyning. 3. The FM broadcast band is . . . r A) 550 – 1,600kHz. r B) 10.7MHz. r C) 88 – 108MHz. r D) 98.7 – 118.7MHz. 9. The circuit designed to supply substantial power output into low impedance load is called . . . r A) power supply. r B) pre-amplifier. r C) power amplifier. r D) detector. 4. The AFC circuit is used to . . . r A) automatically hold the local oscillator on frequency. r B) maintain constant gain in the receiver to prevent such things as fading. r C) prevent amplitude variations of the FM carrier. r D) automatically control the audio frequencies in the receiver. 5. The device most often used for changing the local oscillator frequency with the AFC voltage is a . . . r A) feedthrough capacitor. r B) variable inductor. r C) varactor. r D) trimmer capacitor. 10. The gain of the LM-386 amplifier can be set in range from . . . r A) 1 to 20. r B) 20 to 200. r C) 0 to 200. r D) 50 to 100. Answers: 1. D, 2. A, 3. C, 4. A, 5. C, 6. A, 7. C, 8. D, 9. C, 10. B
The TDA7000 is a monolithic integrated circuit for mono FM portable radios, where a minimum on peripheral components is important (small dimensions and low costs). The IC has an FLL (Frequency-Locked-Loop) system with an intermediate frequency of 70 kHz. The i.f. selectivity is obtained by active RC filters. The only function which needs alignment is the resonant circuit for the oscillator, thus selecting the reception frequency. Spurious reception is avoided by means of a mute circuit, which also eliminates too noisy input signals. Special precautions are taken to meet the radiation requirements. The TDA7000 includes the following functions: • R.F. input stage • Mixer • Local oscillator • I.F. amplifier/limiter • Phase demodulator • Mute detector • Mute switch QUICK REFERENCE DATA 2,7 to 10 V Supply voltage range (pin 5) VP Supply current at VP = 4,5 V IP typ. R.F. input frequency range frf 1,5 to 110 MHz 8 mA Sensitivity for -3 dB limiting (e.m.f. voltage) (source impedance: 75 Ω; mute disabled) EMF typ. 1,5 µV EMF typ. 200 mV Signal handling (e.m.f. voltage) (source impedance: 75 Ω) A.F. output voltage at RL = 22 kΩ Vo PACKAGE OUTLINE 18-lead DIL; plastic (SOT102HE); SOT102-1; 1996 July 24. May 1992 2 typ. 75 mV Philips Semiconductors Product speciﬁcation FM radio circuit TDA7000 Fig.1 Block diagram. May 1992 3 Philips Semiconductors Product speciﬁcation FM radio circuit TDA7000 RATINGS Limiting values in accordance with the Absolute Maximum System (IEC 134) Supply voltage (pin 5) VP max. 12 V Oscillator voltage (pin 6) V6-5 Total power dissipation see derating curve Fig.2 Storage temperature range Tstg Operating ambient temperature range Tamb VP−0,5 to VP + 0,5 V −55 to +150 °C 0 to + 60 °C Fig.2 Power derating curve. D.C. CHARACTERISTICS VP = 4,5 V; Tamb = 25 °C; measured in Fig.4; unless otherwise speciﬁed... A.C. CHARACTERISTICS VP = 4,5 V; Tamb = 25 °C; measured in Fig.4 (mute switch open, enabled); frf = 96 MHz (tuned to max. signal at 5 µV e.m.f.) modulated with ∆f = ± 22,5 kHz; fm = 1 kHz; EMF = 0,2 mV (e.m.f. voltage at a source impedance of 75 Ω); r.m.s. noise voltage measured unweighted (f = 300 Hz to 20 kHz); unless otherwise speciﬁed... Signal handling (e.m.f. voltage) for THD < 10%; ∆f = ± 75 kHz Signal-to-noise ratio Total harmonic distortion AM suppression of output voltage (ratio of the AM output signal referred to the FM output signal) FM signal: fm = 1 kHz; ∆f = ± 75 kHz AM signal: fm = 1 kHz; m = 80% Ripple rejection (∆VP = 100 mV; f = 1 kHz) Oscillator voltage (r.m.s. value) at pin 6 Variation of oscillator frequency ∆fosc...
Factsheet about 9/11 What happened on 11 September 2001? In the early morning of 11 September 2001, 19 hijackers took control of four airliners taking off from different airports in the US – Boston, Washington DC and Newark in New Jersey. View of the World Trade Center, New York, under attack on 11 September 2001 At 8.46am, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York. Seventeen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower. The third airliner, American Airlines Flight 77, crashed into the Pentagon in Washington DC at 9.37am, and the final plane, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed en route to Washington after passengers on board had fought with the hijackers. It is thought that the hijackers were aiming to hit either the Capitol building in Washington or the White House. All US airports were quickly shut down and all aircraft on their way to the country were turned away. The search for survivors at the sites of the attacks began immediately, although with little hope of success. At 9.59am, the fire that had been started by the crash caused the South Tower of the World Trade Center to collapse; this was followed by the collapse of the North Tower at 10.28am. Nearly 3,000 people were killed – most of them instantly. These horrific events were witnessed on TV by millions of people around the world, who by now had realised that the USA was coming under massive terrorist attack. Find out more by visiting: www.911educationprogramme.co.uk The Pentagon, Washington DC, minutes after it had been attacked on 11 September 2001 Page 2 At 8.30pm, US President of the George W. Bush addressed the nation on television and said: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong.” After the broadcast, he met his advisers to review the day. They already had evidence that the attacks had been organised by Osama bin Laden – the leader of the extreme terrorist group Al-Qaeda, which was based in Afghanistan. From his base in Afghanistan, bin Laden supported an increasing number of suicide missions against the USA during the 1990s. The attacks were planned with increasing care and attention to detail – and with a desire to capture the attention of the world. Osama bin Laden in 1997 Why did the attacks on the USA happen? In 2004, Osama bin Laden finally admitted that Al-Qaeda, an extremist terrorist organisation, had been responsible for organising the 9/11 attacks. This confirmed what the US Government had believed all along. For many years, Osama bin Laden had called on Muslims to attack US soldiers and citizens wherever they could. He saw the US as an arch enemy of Islam. His aim was to get the US military out of their bases in Saudi Arabia, where they had remained after the Gulf War in 1991. Saudi Arabia is home to Islam’s most holy sites in the cities of Mecca and Medina, and bin Laden felt that America’s presence there was an affront to all Muslims. He also strongly objected to America’s support for Israel, which he believed wrongly occupied lands that belonged to fellow Muslims....
The September 11 Travel Operation The success of the September 11 plot depended on the ability of the hijackers to obtain visas and pass an immigration and customs inspection in order to enter the United States. It also depended on their ability to remain here undetected while they worked out the operational details of the attack. If they had failed on either count—entering and becoming embedded—the plot could not have been executed. Here we present the facts and circumstances of the hijackers’ travel operation, including their 25 contacts with consular officers and their 43 contacts with immigration and customs authorities. We also discuss the 12 contacts with border authorities by other September 11 conspirators who applied for a visa. The narrative is chronological, retracing the hijackers’ steps from their initial applications for U.S. visas, through their entry into the United States, to their applications for immigration benefits, and up through their acquisition of state identifications that helped them board the planes. Along the way, we note relevant actions by U.S. government authorities to combat terrorism. There were a few lucky breaks for U.S. border authorities in this story. Mostly, though, it is a story of how 19 hijackers easily penetrated U.S. border security. Overview of the hijacker’s visas The 9/11 hijackers submitted 23 visa applications during the course of the plot, and 22 of these applications were approved. The hijackers applied for visas at five U.S. consulates or embassies overseas; two of them were interviewed. One consular officer issued visas to 11 of the 19 hijackers. Of the eight other conspirators in the plot who sought visas, three succeeded, but only one of the three later sought to use the visa to enter the United States. Hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar were the first to submit visa applications because they were originally slated to be pilots. The four hijackers who did become pilots applied for visas in 2000. The remaining “muscle” hijackers applied in the fall of 2000 through the spring and summer of 2001, three applying twice. Most of the hijackers applied with new passports, possibly to hide travel to Afghanistan recorded in their old ones. It is likely that many of the hijackers’ passports contained indicators of extremism or showed ties to al Qaeda. However, this intelligence was not developed prior to 9/11, and thus State Department personnel reviewing visa applications were not trained to spot these indicators of a terrorist connection. Visa decisions for the hijackers and conspirators were consistent with a system that focused on excluding intending immigrants and depended on checking a database of names to search for criminals and terrorists. Overview of the hijackers’ entries The hijackers successfully entered the United States 33 of 34 times, with the first arriving on January 15, 2000, at Los Angeles International Airport. All others entered through ...
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v CONTENTS List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1 nside the Four Flights 1 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 National Crisis Management 35. 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47. A Declaration of War 47 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63. 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71. From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— . . . in the Law Enforcement Community 73 . . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82 . . . and in the Intelligence Community 86. Page vi . . . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93 . . . and in the White House 98 . . . and in the Congress 102. 4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 4.1. Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 Crisis: August 1998 115 Diplomacy 121 Covert Action 126 Searching for Fresh Options 134 5. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 145. Terrorist Entrepreneurs 145 The “Planes Operation” 153 The Hamburg Contingent 160 A Money Trail? 169 6. FROM THREAT TO THREAT 174. The Millennium Crisis 174 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 182 The Attack on the USS Cole 190 Change and Continuity 198 The New Administration’s Approach 203 7. THE ATTACK LOOMS 215. First Arrivals in California 215 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States 223 Assembling the Teams 231 Final Strategies and Tactics 241 8. “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” 254. The Summer of Threat 254 Late Leads—Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM 266 9. HEROISM AND HORROR 278. Preparedness as of September 11 278 September 11, 2001 285 Emergency Response at the Pentagon 311 Analysis 315. 10. WARTIME 325 10.1 Immediate Responses at Home 326 10.2 Planning for War 330 10.3 “Phase Two” and the Question of Iraq 334 11. FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT 339. Imagination 339 Policy 348 Capabilities 350 Management 353 12. WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY 361. Reflecting on a Generational Challenge 361 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations 365 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism 374 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks 383 13. HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT 399. Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide 400 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community 407 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information 416 Unity of Effort in the Congress 419 Organizing America’s Defenses in the United States 423 Appendix A: Common Abbreviations 429 Appendix B:Table of Names 431 Appendix C: Commission Hearings 439 Notes 449
Main Interior Building, Tuesday, September 11, 2001 ............ 1. Continuity of Operations . ..... victims than to recall factual details. Yet both types of information are... National Park Service U.S. Department of the Interior National Center for Cultural Resources National Park Service Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Janet A. McDonnell 1 2 3 4 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks
Rebuilding the Future The new World Trade Center embodies a bold vision: to remember, renew, and rebuild the future. With One World Trade Center, the National September 11 Memorial & Museum, a state-of-the-art Transportation Hub, Vehicular Security Center, and more, the new site represents the triumph of the human spirit. The new World Trade Center is destined to become, once again, the world’s premier destination for commerce, culture and community. Fact Sheet 9/11 Memorial The National September 11 Memorial & Museum at the World Trade Center will memorialize the victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks, a national tragedy that changed the course of history. Visitors will be able to learn, remember and pay tribute to those who lost their lives in New York, N.Y.; Shanksville, P.A.; and Washington, D.C., as well as the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. “Reflecting Absence,” the Memorial, consists of two massive voids sized over the footprints of the original Twin Towers with waterfalls cascading down their sides. The names of those who perished as a result of the attacks are inscribed around the edges of the Memorial waterfalls. The Memorial Plaza serves as a contemplative space amid the cacophony of sights and sounds of Lower Manhattan. A state-of-the-art museum, featuring interactive exhibitions, artifacts, memorabilia, a resource center, and areas for reflection will complement the Memorial. Monthly Highlights The Plaza is now open to the public daily. Visitors use kiosks with interactive displays to direct them to the names on the bronze parapets. Concrete work continues in the remaining northeast quadrant of the plaza as work progresses in the Pavilion and the below-grade Museum. construction progress Project particulars • Steel erection commenced on September 2, 2008, with the erection of a 7,700 pound column located near the footprint of the original World Trade Center’s North Tower. • A 65-foot-high by 62-foot wide piece of the original foundation wall, or slurry wall, is being preserved to allow visitors of the Memorial Museum to view it. A reinforcing wall was built behind this section to ensure the slurry wall’s integrity. • A total of 65,000 cubic yards of concrete, coupled with 8,658 tons of steel, are being used to build the Memorial. • The design for the Memorial was conceived by architect Michael Arad and landscape architect Peter Walker. More than 5,200 entrants from 63 nations completed in the Memorial Design Competition. Pavilion The Pavilion electrical contractor is pulling lines to feed power to equipment on the 3rd floor while maintaining temporary light and power during work hours. The miscellaneous metals contractor is installing miscellaneous steel throughout the site. The concrete contractor will be stripping formwork on the roof and the 3rd floor. Memorial Museum The plumbing contractor is working on punch list items while maintaining temporary water. In addition, the carpenter is installing sheetrock around the pick hole with the use of a lift on elevation 242' as well as plastering sheetrock walls around the South Footprint. The electrical contractor is maintaining temporary light and power. Johnson Controls will be working on start-up equipment in the north and south mechanical rooms at elevation 284' and elevation 264', respectively. Five Star is working on IT at the Telecom Main Distribution Frame (MDF), and working on fire alarm systems throughout the site. The contractor is installing light fixtures on the catwalk above the west chamber ceiling. The concrete contractor is installing formwork and rebar at elevation 284' by the Grand Staircase.
For a Criminal Investigation of the Events of September 11th, 2001 The worst single criminal act ever committed on US soil, the attacks of September 11th, 2001 have served as justiﬁcation for: US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; a new doctrine of preventive war; the USA PATRIOT Act and Department of Homeland Security; torture and indeﬁnite detention of “enemy combatants”; surveillance of citizens without a court warrant; and shifting trillions of dollars in public spending priorities. Surveys by Zogby and Scripps-Howard found that signiﬁcant proportions of US citizens believe their own government had “actionable foreknowledge” of the attacks and “consciously failed to act” (Zogby 2004), or even that elements of the state were involved in orchestrating the attacks. The widespread disbelief in the ofﬁcial story indicates a deep crisis of trust in government, one that only an exhaustive and fearless criminal investigation can address. We ﬁrmly believe there is probable cause for such an investigation. The case for investigation is based on three pillars: 1) evidence of cover-up and a lack of serious investigation after the fact; 2) evidence of misconduct on the day of 9/11 3) evidence of foreknowledge and preparation before September 11th. Undertaking a full-scale, truly independent investigation is imperative, not only because there must be justice for the victims, but also because of the role 9/11 has played in justifying policies of aggression supposedly justifed by 9/11 must be halted, and a shattered public trust must be repaired. The 9/11 Cover-up 1 • During their 2002 inquiry, the Congressional joint intelligence committees (who redacted 1/4 of their report) were scrutinized by an FBI counter-investigation, which invaded the Senate in search of an alleged leak. It was widely believed that the FBI investigation may have been intended to have a chilling effect on the conduct of the Congressional Joint Inquiry. • The Congressional investigation failed to pursue solid evidence of a money trail to the alleged hijackers from the US-allied Pakistani intelligence agency (ISI). The ISI chief was removed from his post when strong evidence of his connection to the plot surfaced in early October 2001, but no serious punitive action was taken against him. • Evidence was destroyed or withheld, including suppression of the discovery of black boxes from the two ﬂights at Ground Zero and the destruction of tapes made by the air trafﬁc controllers who handled the same ﬂights.2 • Whistleblowers such as FBI translator Sibel Edmonds and Anthony Shaffer of “Able Danger” were disciplined or ﬁred, even as FBI, CIA, and military ofﬁcials who were blamed for failures received promotions and medals. • The September 11th relatives who lobbied for the 9/11 Commission (after 14 months of White House resistance) submitted 400 questions that Commissioners accepted as a “roadmap.” 70 percent of the questions were fully ignored in The 9/11 Commission Report. Many of the relatives later declared the Report a whitewash.3 • 9/11 Commissioner Max Cleland resigned in late 2003, calling the panel a whitewash and saying, “Bush is scamming America.” There • Philip Zelikow, the 9/11 Commission executive director who oversaw the panel’s activities, refused to step down after the September 11th families called for his resignation due to grave conﬂicts of interest (close association with Condoleezza Rice, member of White House national security staff both before 9/11 and in 2002, member of Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board). • Rice may have committed perjury in her April 2004 Commission testimony that an August 2001 Presidential Daily Brieﬁng to Bush was only of “historical signiﬁcance,” when in fact it detailed current intelligence. • The 9/11 Commission Report claimed the ﬁnancial background of the attacks was unknown, but dismissed the question as being of “little practical signiﬁcance” (page 172). Since when doesn’t an investigation “follow the money”? • Large sections of the report are based on the confessions of “enemy combatants” such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, as provided in the form of transcripts by the government. The 9/11 Commission staff was not allowed to see or interview any of these “enemy combatants.” • Over a period of several years, NORAD, FAA, White House and military ofﬁcials gave widely divergent and conﬂicting accounts of the air defense response to 9/11, but no one was ever held accountable for upholding falsehoods. The 9/11 Commission chairs later admitted they considered a criminal investigation of NORAD’s statements, but preferred instead to present a unanimous report. • The focus of the Commission will be on the future. We’re not interested in trying to assess blame. We do not consider that part of the Commission’s responsibility. – Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission vice-chairman.
On September 11, 2001, the seismic stations grouped around New York City recorded seismic events from the WTC site, two of which occurred immediately prior to the aircraft impacts upon the Twin Towers. Because these seismic events preceded the collisions, it is clear they were not associated with the impacts and must therefore be associated with some other occurrence. None of the authorities charged with the responsibility for the investigation of the events of 9/11 have proposed a source for these seismic events, nor have they given a valid reason for the difference in times between the seismic events and the aircraft impacts. Only by consideration of the evidence of basement explosions before the aircraft impacts, as experienced by William Rodriquez and 36 others, can an explanation be found for the fact that the seismic stations recorded seismic events originating from the WTC sites prior to the aircraft impacts. It seems unlikely that Middle Eastern terrorists could have overcome the WTC security and managed this kind of high-level, technological coordination. Do the facts presented here, simple and few, raise the possibility of inside involvement in 9/11/01, both before and after the attack? OVERVIEW This paper is primarily concerned with the factual data surrounding the exact impact times of the two aircraft that hit WTC1 and WTC2. This is neither theory nor hypothesis, but a statement of publicized facts regarding the timing of the aircraft impacts. There exist two separate precision data time sets that address when the aircraft crashed into the Towers. Both data time sets are based on UTC (Coordinated Universal Time, the world’s atomic clock system) and the sources that determined these times were prestigious, reliable and credible. There is no question regarding the precision and accuracy of the instruments used to record both data time sets, since their entire function depends and relies upon temporal accuracy, and therefore there can be no doubt that both data time sets are correct. The time data sets represent objective scientific data recorded by two separate, independent entities. The problem is the data sets have different impact times. These times were given out years ago but at different times. Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at Columbia University (LDEO) gave its findings around the time of the event with what it thought were impact times based upon the seismic data recorded, while the 9/11 Commission published its impact times, based upon FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic, years later in its Final Report. The Commission no longer exists.