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Para las organizaciones con preocupaciones de seguridad en sus entornos UNIX y Seguridad en redes, el cumplimiento y auditoría, Webimprints ofrece una solución integral para garantizar el acceso de 'root', otorga control de acceso granular para realizar privilegiado comandos de súper usuario y monitorización en tiempo real o grabado reproducción de sesiones SSH pulsaciones con la capacidad de búsqueda de sesiones a nivel de comando.
http://bloomingtonford.com/inventory/newsearch/New/ | Whether you are looking for style, fuel efficiency, top speeds, high-tech gadgets, eco-friendly components or deluxe safety features Ford’s 2015 models won’t disappoint. We cruise through some of the most popular cars in America and highlight some of the amazing features.
This paper examines the complex, often misunderstood, relationship between al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the various militant groups found in FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in Pakistan, including the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan). Much of what is commonly assumed about the Taliban, the TTP and al-Qaeda is based on misinformation, misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of historical events. The Taliban and alQaeda can in many ways be seen as sharing common values, although their ultimate goals remain very different. The Taliban were not part of the mujahedeen fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and emerged only in 1994. Al-Qaeda, for all the conspiracy, did not receive money from the CIA during the 1980s, and was only officially formed as an organisation in 1988. The creation of the TTP in 2007 is another matter, and was created as an umbrella organisation for various Pakistani militant groups, and maintains close ties with al-Qaeda. However, the Pakistani Taliban is not the same Taliban as the one formed in 1994, and although it swears its loyalty to Mullah Omar, its goals differ from that of the Afghani Taliban. We can speak of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in two broad strokes – pre 9/11 and post 9/11. The attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon (as well as the failed attack on Washington DC with the hijacked flight 93), was the culmination of al-Qaeda as a tightly knit, hierarchical organisation. The subsequent “War on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 destroyed much of its organisational capacity; it also left the Taliban severely weakened. However, they both regrouped in the FATA region over a period of years, and al-Qaeda spread its ideology throughout northern Pakistan, coalescing with militant groups and local warlords. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were very much two different organisations; today, it is not so simple, and in 2010, General David Petreus claimed that there is “a symbiotic relationship between all of these different organizations: al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban ... They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each other.” (cfr, 2010, http://www.cfr.org).
Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union, with a centralized leadership structure made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization’s plots either emanated from the top or were approved by the leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to a corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief Executive Officer issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Out of necessity, due to pressures from the security community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. The core leadership, headed by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, is thought to live in the mountainous tribal belt of northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, where it continues to train operatives, recruit, and disseminate propaganda. But Al Qaeda franchises or affiliated groups active in countries such as Yemen and Somalia now represent critical power centers in the larger movement. Some affiliates receive money, training, and weapons; others look to the core leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance, theological justification, and a larger narrative of global struggle.
A l-Qa’ida seems to be on its heels. The death of Osama bin Laden and the fall of Arab dictators have left its leadership in disarray, its narrative confused, and the organization on the defensive. One silver lining for al-Qaida, however, has been its affiliate organizations. In Iraq, the Maghreb, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, alQa’ida has used local groups to expand its reach, increase its power, and grow its numbers. This string of mergers is not over. In places as diverse as the Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria, al-Qa’ida-linked organizations are emerging. However, the jihadist world is more fractured than it may appear at first glance. Many Salafi-jihadist groups have not joined with al-Qa’ida, and even if they have, tensions and divisions occur that present the United States and its allies with opportunities for weakening the bond. at the same time, several Salafi-jihadist groups chose not to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, including Egypt’s Gamaat al-Islamiyya and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and fighters in Chechnya, Gaza, and Pakistan maintained their distance as well. Motivations to the Affiliate for Joining There are a number of reasons why a group may choose to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, some practical, some ideological, and some personal: • • Al-Qa’ida has always been both a group with its own agenda and a facilitator of other terrorist groups. This meant that it not only carried out attacks on U.S. targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen throughout the 1990s, but it helped other jihadist groups with funding, training, and additional logistical essentials. Toward the end of the 1990s, alQa’ida incorporated Egyptian Islamic Jihad into its structure. After September 11, 2001, this process of deepening its relationship with outside groups took off, and today a number of regional groups bear the label “al-Qa’ida” in their name, along with a more local designation.
All rights reserved. Except as expressly provided herein, no part of this manual may be reproduced, copied, transmitted, disseminated, downloaded or stored in any storage medium, for any purpose without the express prior written consent of Garmin. Garmin hereby grants permission to download a single copy of this manual onto a hard drive or other electronic storage medium to be viewed and to print one copy of this manual or of any revision hereto, provided that such electronic or printed copy of this manual must contain the complete text of this copyright notice and provided further that any unauthorized commercial distribution of this manual or any revision hereto is strictly prohibited. Information in this document is subject to change without notice. Garmin reserves the right to change or improve its products and to make changes in the content without obligation to notify any person or organization of such changes or improvements. Visit the Garmin Web site (www.garmin.com) for current updates and supplemental information concerning the use and operation of this and other Garmin products. Garmin® and MapSource® are registered trademarks, and nüvi™, myGarmin™, Garmin Lock™, and Garmin TourGuide™ are trademarks of Garmin Ltd. or its subsidiaries and may not be used without the express permission of Garmin. The Bluetooth® word mark and logos are owned by the Bluetooth SIG, Inc., and any use of such name by Garmin is under license. Windows® is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. Mac® is a registered trademark of Apple Computer, Inc. SiRF®, SiRFstar®, and the SiRF logo are registered trademarks, and SiRFstarIII™ and SiRF™ Powered are trademarks of SiRF Technology, Inc. Audible.com® and AudibleReady® are registered trademarks of Audible, Inc. © Audible, Inc. 1997-2005. Multilingual Wordbank © Oxford University Press 2001.
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Certain Renault 1.5 DCi models, produced between June 2001 and June 2002, without air-conditioning, could have issues with the accessory drive belt, as a result of tensioner problems. The tensioner base plate could deform, resulting in misalignment, belt noise and early failure. In order to cure this, Renault launched a technical note, saying the old tensioner (OE ref. 8200262773, 8200292784), the 2 tensioner bolts (torxhead) and the accessory drive belt (OE ref. 8200020924) have to be replaced. Vehicles involved: *Clio II, Symbol, Van 1.5DCi. Chassis codes: BB07, BB08, CB07, CB08, LB07, SB07, SB08; with engine K9K700 or K9K702. *Kangoo, Rapid, Express 1.5DCI. Chassis codes: FC07, FC08, KC07, KC09 ; with engine K9K700, K9K702 or K9K710. How to proceed: Loosen tensioner bolts Remove old accessory drive belt Remove old tensioner bolts and tensioner Install new tensioner (OE ref. 8200328372) Use 2 new bolts (OE ref. 7703002059 - hex head) Install the 2 bolts hand tight Install a new Micro-V® XF belt 5PK1133 (OE ref. 8200020924). ATTENTION!!! The pulleys of this drive have 6 grooves, while the needed belt only has 5 ribs. The groove closest to the engine bloc has to remain free. Tensioning the new belt: The belt has to be tensioned (with tool Mot. 1638, OE ref. 0000163800) to a higher tension than with the original drive set-up Technical Bulletin 013 Copyright © 2006 Gates Corporation