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Hibernia Atlantic announced plans Thursday to build a new trans-Atlantic communications cable aimed at high-frequency Traders at the NYSE on May 6. stock traders, shaving 310 miles from the shortest existing route and cutting execution times by about 8%. The cable group's plan is the latest effort to link financial centers with new infrastructure, providing ever-faster trading times, and would be the first new line across the Atlantic in more than a decade. The trans-Atlantic market is WASl-IINGTON--/\ ruport Oil th\' world's second-busiest for fiIhl' May (j "Ilaxh cr.tsh' in II\(' u.uuial trades after LondonIIX stock m.ukct ~lilllS 10 giv(' ;1 Frankfurt. 1\ lWW, shorter cable route developed by Spread Netdefinitive, second-by-second account of the sudden plunge and works recently was opened on is likely to blame a confluence of the third-ranked New York-Chifactors rather than a single cul- cago corridor. prit, people familiar with the reClosing the Gap port said. "There has been a gap in the Atlantic market," said Mike By Jessica Holzer, Saunders, Hibernia Atlantic's Sarah N. Lynch vice president for business deAnd Kara Scannell velopment. Hibernia Atlantic has yet to The report by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Com- sign any definitive customer mission and the Commodity Fu- contracts for the project. It is tures Trading Commission is set targeting high-frequency traders and related financial firms with to be released within days. A draft of the report circuround-trip speeds of less than 60 milliseconds, compared with 65 lated to SEC commissioners didn't call for any specific policy milliseconds using the existing changes, said a person who has AC-1 trans-Atlantic network. Mr. Saunders said the comseen it. Rather, the report attempts to pany aims to start construction explain how market conditions next spring and complete the led to a sudden plunge in the 3,720-mile cable running from Dow Jones Industrial Average of Somerset in southern England to nearly 1,000 points, wiping out Halifax on Canada's eastern searoughly $862 billion in equityboard by mid-2012.
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This paper examines the complex, often misunderstood, relationship between al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the various militant groups found in FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in Pakistan, including the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan). Much of what is commonly assumed about the Taliban, the TTP and al-Qaeda is based on misinformation, misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of historical events. The Taliban and alQaeda can in many ways be seen as sharing common values, although their ultimate goals remain very different. The Taliban were not part of the mujahedeen fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and emerged only in 1994. Al-Qaeda, for all the conspiracy, did not receive money from the CIA during the 1980s, and was only officially formed as an organisation in 1988. The creation of the TTP in 2007 is another matter, and was created as an umbrella organisation for various Pakistani militant groups, and maintains close ties with al-Qaeda. However, the Pakistani Taliban is not the same Taliban as the one formed in 1994, and although it swears its loyalty to Mullah Omar, its goals differ from that of the Afghani Taliban. We can speak of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in two broad strokes – pre 9/11 and post 9/11. The attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon (as well as the failed attack on Washington DC with the hijacked flight 93), was the culmination of al-Qaeda as a tightly knit, hierarchical organisation. The subsequent “War on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 destroyed much of its organisational capacity; it also left the Taliban severely weakened. However, they both regrouped in the FATA region over a period of years, and al-Qaeda spread its ideology throughout northern Pakistan, coalescing with militant groups and local warlords. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were very much two different organisations; today, it is not so simple, and in 2010, General David Petreus claimed that there is “a symbiotic relationship between all of these different organizations: al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban ... They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each other.” (cfr, 2010, http://www.cfr.org).
In 2007, the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged after the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) aligned itself with Al-Qaeda. This development captured the world’s attention and led several scholars and policymakers to ask the question: Why did this merger take place and what does it say about the motivations of GSPC? This research investigates three hypotheses: (1) This merger is merely an ideological one without operational implications; (2) this merger is ideological, operational, and logistical; or (3) this merger is merely a rebranding of a failing organization that needed to survive and, therefore, is not a genuine threat to the United States and its European allies. Exploring the evolution of Algerian Islamism, from the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to the GSPC and AQIM, this study concludes that hypothesis 3 is the best explanation of the merger between GSPC and Al-Qaeda. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
Pensez à recycler Think recycling Publication no 2013-05-01 de la série Regards sur le monde : avis d’experts This report contains the results of a research project led by the academic outreach program of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to explore the future of the Al-Qaeda phenomenon. It consists of alternative future scenarios developed during a workshop, as well as four original papers written by individual specialists at the request of CSIS. The report is not an analytical document and does not represent any formal assessment or position of CSIS or the Government of Canada. All components of the project were held under Chatham House rule; therefore, the identity of the authors and the participants is not disclosed. www.csis-scrs.gc.ca Published April 2013 Printed in Canada © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada Photo credit: istockphoto.com World Watch: Expert Notes series publication No. 2013-05-01 Le présent rapport contient les conclusions d’un projet d’étude mené dans le cadre du programme de liaison recherche du Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS) pour examiner l’avenir du phénomène al-Qaïda. Il présente des scénarios envisagés lors d’un atelier, ainsi que quatre études originales rédigées par différents spécialistes à la demande du SCRS. Le présent rapport n’est pas un document analytique et ne représente pas la position officielle du SCRS ou du gouvernement du Canada. Tout le projet s’est déroulé conformément à la règle de Chatham House; les auteurs ne sont donc pas cités et les noms des participants ne sont pas révélés. www.scrs-csis.gc.ca Publié en avril 2013 Imprimé au Canada © Sa Majesté la Reine du chef du Canada Crédit photo : istockphoto.com Ce document est imprimé avec de l’encre sans danger pour l’environement
A l-Qa’ida seems to be on its heels. The death of Osama bin Laden and the fall of Arab dictators have left its leadership in disarray, its narrative confused, and the organization on the defensive. One silver lining for al-Qaida, however, has been its affiliate organizations. In Iraq, the Maghreb, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, alQa’ida has used local groups to expand its reach, increase its power, and grow its numbers. This string of mergers is not over. In places as diverse as the Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria, al-Qa’ida-linked organizations are emerging. However, the jihadist world is more fractured than it may appear at first glance. Many Salafi-jihadist groups have not joined with al-Qa’ida, and even if they have, tensions and divisions occur that present the United States and its allies with opportunities for weakening the bond. at the same time, several Salafi-jihadist groups chose not to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, including Egypt’s Gamaat al-Islamiyya and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and fighters in Chechnya, Gaza, and Pakistan maintained their distance as well. Motivations to the Affiliate for Joining There are a number of reasons why a group may choose to affiliate with al-Qa’ida, some practical, some ideological, and some personal: • • Al-Qa’ida has always been both a group with its own agenda and a facilitator of other terrorist groups. This meant that it not only carried out attacks on U.S. targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen throughout the 1990s, but it helped other jihadist groups with funding, training, and additional logistical essentials. Toward the end of the 1990s, alQa’ida incorporated Egyptian Islamic Jihad into its structure. After September 11, 2001, this process of deepening its relationship with outside groups took off, and today a number of regional groups bear the label “al-Qa’ida” in their name, along with a more local designation.